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Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600020012-2

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. There is no definitive role for psychological warfare in the military or national structure of the United States.

2. The other great nations of the world employ psychological warfare techniques in their conduct of foreign, domestic and military activities.

3. Development of the psychological warfare effort during World War II was beset with difficulties and confusion which delayed the use and lessened the effectiveness of this implement of national policy.

4. Determination of United States foreign policy and the conduct of foreign affairs is the responsibility of the President and the Department of State.

5. The War and Navy Departments have a vital interest in the determination and support of our foreign policy, insofar as it affects the national security and state of preparedness of the nation.

6. World War II experience provides "lessons learned" in connection with the national psychological warfare effort.

7. Adequate or satisfactory solution of many of the problems of psychological warfare in World War II was not made.

8. Psychological warfare is defined as the planned use of all measures, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to assist in the accomplishment of our military or national aims, with the following ultimate objectives:

a. To assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight.

b. To sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy.

c. To improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States.

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NSC review(s) completed.

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### DISCUSSION

1. Psychological warfare techniques have been employed by the United States since the Revolutionary era, yet no firm determination has as yet been made of the proper role of psychological warfare, in peace and war, in the national structure. Leaflets were disseminated to the British forces during the Battle of Bunker's Hill and clandestine pamphlets were circulated among the British troops and mercenaries as they were about to embark for America. Efforts have been redeveloped in each time of national emergency but little use has been made of prior experience in this field, as interest in psychological warfare and its application has been allowed to lapse after each war. World War II experience has proven that psychological warfare is a valuable adjunct to the conduct of foreign affairs and military operations.

2. The other great nations of the world devote considerable effort to furthering their national aims, both domestic and foreign, and military objectives by psychological warfare techniques. Radio broadcasts, controlled or semi-controlled press articles, books and pamphlets are being used to convey, at home and abroad, the arguments and appeals which assist in achieving national objectives.

3. In World War II, United States Psychological Warfare organization evolved in an empirical fashion with definite assignments of responsibilities not achieved until well along in the war.

a. On 11 July 1941, the President issued an executive order creating the Office of Coordinator of Information and appointed William J. Donovan as coordinator. Mr. Donovan proceeded on the assumption that the coordinators should coordinate not only all incoming information, but also information flowing from this country to the rest of the world. The Foreign Information Service was organized as a separate branch of this office, was situated in

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New York City and charged with the responsibility for coordinating international broadcasting from this country. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was created by executive order on 30 July 1941. This office was an outgrowth of the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics, which had been created by the Council of National Defense on 16 August 1940. The CIAA was charged with the responsibility for formulating and executing programs in the commercial and economic fields to further the well-being of the Western Hemisphere.

b. On 26 October 1941, an executive order created the Office of Facts and Figures for the purpose of facilitating the dissemination of factual information to the citizens of the country on the progress of the defense efforts, and on the defense policy and activities of the government.

c. In May 1942, it had become obvious that the three previously mentioned agencies were not working satisfactorily. In an attempt to remedy this defect, the President by an executive order created the Office of War Information and brought into the new agency the OWI, abolished the COI, exclusive of the Foreign Information Service, and transferred to the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the remaining functions which were established as the Office of Strategic Services.

d. The establishment of OWI and the other changes did little to remedy the overlap of functions or the confusion of mandates and the personality problems involved. In fact, on 10 March 1943, the President, himself, intervened and issued a clarifying order outlining the respective responsibilities. The order read as follows:

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(1) "The Office of War Information will plan, develop, and execute all phases of the federal program of radio, press, publication, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information. The program for foreign propaganda in areas of actual or projected military operations will be co-ordinated with military plans through the planning agencies of the War and Navy Departments, and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Parts of the foreign propaganda program which are to be executed in a theater of military operations will be subject to the control of the theater commander. The authority, functions and duties of the Office of War Information shall not extend to the Western Hemisphere, exclusive of the United States and Canada.

(2) The military order of June 13, 1942, establishing the Office of Strategic Services, is hereby modified to the extent necessary to make this order effective."

e. The JCS had created (JCS 12) on 3 March 1942, the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, which was envisaged in the ultimate authority over both secret operations and propaganda. However, the establishment of the OWI created a Policy Board on which the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, as well as the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, was to be represented. This further increased the confusion which was somewhat remedied by the executive order of 10 March 1943, mentioned above.

f. On 22 February 1943, General Donovan sent to the JCS a memorandum inclosing an "overall strategic plan for United States Psychological Warfare". This paper became JCS 230, dated 1 March 1943. This paper was never completely approved, and underwent many changes and finally appeared as JCS 155-11-D of 27 October 1943, which clarified the OSS functions.

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g. With the creation of the OWI, the JCS appointed liaison officers from the War and Navy Departments with the OWI. The duties of these liaison officers were as follows:

- (1) To sit as members of the Overseas Planning Group of the OWI.
- (2) To maintain contact with all planning agencies of the JCS and to furnish the Overseas Planning Group of the Office of the OWI with as much of JCS plans as authorized by JCS and as necessary.
- (3) To insure correlation between military and propaganda plans; to transmit requests from JCS to OWI relative to propaganda activities desiring for the purpose of furthering military operations.
- (4) To present to the JCS all basic and such propaganda plans which required their approval.

h. Thus, a tenuous of channel for partial integration with the military effort of various psychological warfare efforts was established.

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4. The President and the State Department set the foreign policy of the United States. There are four instruments for making this policy effective: diplomacy, economic bargaining and pressure, threat or employment of military force, and information or propaganda. Maximum effectiveness in the management of our foreign relations can only be achieved if all four instruments are used in a planned and coordinated fashion. It is necessary for those in charge of planning, coordination, and execution to be keenly aware of the capabilities and limitations of the various techniques offered by all four elements. In time of war, the use of these elements is determined by the war situation and become instruments of warfare. In this connection it is important to distinguish three phases in international relations:

a. Time of peace with varying degrees of international tension:

During this phase the major information emphasis is on the explanation and justification of America's foreign policy, and on describing America's peaceful pursuits, her natural resources, her industrial and agricultural organization and potentialities, and her scientific and cultural activities and achievements.

b. Time of international crisis but juridical peace:

This phase appears if and when international relations between America and other powers develop to the point where strong political, economic and military pressure are required to effectuate America's foreign policy.

It will be signalled by an act of the President or of

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the Congress, or both, comparable to the declaration of emergency in 1939, or the announcement of a policy to take immediate military action to defend America's nationals against possible foreign aggression. The major emphasis shifts from a purely informational and cultural program, to greater reliance upon tactics and propaganda more appropriate to political warfare.

**e. Time of War:**

This phase is characterized by both psychological and political warfare activities. New channels and media for the dissemination of propaganda are created as adjuncts to military formations in theaters of operations.

5. World War II experience proved that psychological warfare, when properly employed, can be a potent weapon. Its effectiveness was lessened, however, by certain faults inherent in the haphazard development of psychological warfare organizations. Some of the most glaring deficiencies were:

- (a) Dispersion of authority and responsibility among several Washington agencies, with lack of coordination on all levels.
- (b) Lack of central policy-making and planning.
- (c) Friction among top officials and operating personnel of the agencies concerned.
- (d) Lack of understanding of the nature, capabilities and limitations of psychological warfare.
- (e) Incomplete integration of psychological warfare agencies

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into the military command in the field.

(f) Field planning and execution of psychological warfare insufficiently coordinated with central planning and policy.

6. In connection with the division of authority and responsibilities for various phases of psychological warfare, the question of assignment of responsibilities for ~~clandestine~~ <sup>CLANDESTINE</sup> psychological warfare functions has been considered.

Since the Central Intelligence Group, NIA, has assumed the ~~major~~ <sup>major</sup> intelligence functions of the Office of Strategic Services, and since it appears to be the only existing agency of the government which ~~could be~~ <sup>could be</sup> capable of conducting ~~the~~ <sup>certain phases of</sup> ~~subversive functions of~~ psychological warfare, it is believed that it should be charged with ~~the responsibility~~ <sup>all clandestine PW</sup> for the functions performed in this field ~~by the Office of Strategic Services~~. However, the matter is considered to be of such importance and methods of coordination and control require such extensive study that it is considered that the permanent committee should investigate the problem and make appropriate recommendations.

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7. Consideration of various problems involved in the preparedness for wartime use has developed the following ideas and recommendations:

a. The need for a highly centralized and well defined policy and directive flow as worked out on the attached chart A.

b. The need for a military organization on the Theater Commander's Staff for the conduct of military psychological warfare. (See chart B for a recommended basic organization.) Both of the above are matters which should be further studied by the permanent committee with the view of making recommendations for their establishment.

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8. One of the major problems in the theaters of operations was the utilization of civilian personnel, and their integration into military organization. In the consideration of this problem, opinion from all theaters was that whatever cogent reasons may exist for employment of civilians in the Zone of the Interior, practical problems in the theaters make this a continuing source of personnel trouble. Between military and civilian personnel serving in the field, problems of pay differentials, standards of responsibility, discipline, privilege and the like are such as to cause resentment, jealousy and strife particularly in the type of individual with the peculiar talents demanded by psychological warfare. Integration of the same individuals into the military chain of command, as soldiers rather than civilians, would resolve many of these personnel difficulties. This procedure was followed successfully in several branches of the service which required speedy mobilization of large numbers of technicians some of whom were draft-exempt for physical or other reasons. (A case in point is the Transportation Corps, where railroad operating people were brought into the army for that specific purpose and given railroad jobs in the theaters, as officers and non-coms, not as civilians.) It is proposed that planning for recruitment of personnel be on the following basis: Volunteers and draft-exempt individuals to be permitted to enlist specifically for psychological warfare duty, with assured ratings as non-commissioned officers, or, in the case of qualified personnel, as officers (See below). Draftees to be selected for psychological warfare duty at reception centers on the basis of definite civilian skills, to be given basic military training and assigned to psychological warfare activities with ratings dependent upon (a) Civilian experience, (b) Adaptability to military requirements, (c) Job rating to which assigned - (necessarily in above order). Basis for offer of commission or non-commissioned officer status -

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rating will require careful study. It should be noted that the present position of the high-rated non-com in the army is excellent, with pay ranging up to \$165.00 monthly (plus 20% overseas pay and allowances), and that the present trend is toward equalization of privilege and position between officers and enlisted ranks. With much of the "glamor" removed from the officer status and with adequate pay as non-coms for competent technicians, it may be assumed that more qualified people may be attracted. Temporary commissions may be offered to personnel who can qualify after short indoctrination courses, the basis of selection being carefully considered.

9. Consideration has been given, at least briefly, to the majority of the items inclosed in the attached agenda for the Psychological Warfare Committee. However, the extensive study required to investigate the majority of the items listed, has prevented the committee from making a complete study of the problem. It is felt that a permanent committee should study the items indicated in addition to others which may arise. The ad hoc committee is prepared to turn over to the permanent committee work drafts and other matters which were considered by the committee, but are not properly a part of the report.

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